While the United States pursues its “war against terrorism," Iran remains a major obstacle in its regional schemes. With the fall of Baghdad, Iran and North Korea remained the two milestones in the "axis of evil." While North Korea is far and American ability to act against it is limited, Iran is in the heart of the USA area of major concern (between Afghanistan and Iraq) and located in a region of main interest (oil). Iran's missile and nuclear programs, its support for Islamists movements (in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinians), its opposition to the Palestinian-Israel peace process, and—no less importantly—its policy in Iraq, made it even a greater challenge. In fact, wherever Washington turns its eyes in the region, it sees Tehran acting against its interests.
In addition to major ideological, strategic and economic interests, it seems that emotions and misconceptions have also characterized the American approach towards Iran. Khomeini’s zealous anti-American stance, the hostage crisis (1979-1981), the Iran-Contra affair (1985-1986) and the experience of Americans held hostage by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon (early 1980s), were among the issues that have deeply hurt American feelings—much more than the Iranians seem to have realized. The wide political and cultural differences between the two countries also made it difficult for Washington to comprehend Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric and its blurred and inconsistent policies. On its part, the United States also seemed to be sending mixed signals to Tehran, from the hostility upon the fall of the Shah and during the Iran-Iraq War to “dealings” over the Iran-Contra affair, and from its “dual containment” policy to the concurrent expansion of economic ties in the early 1990s. Clearly, the American rhetoric against Iran was no milder than Iranian discourse. Iran was often referred to as an “outlaw nation” and “the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism.”
The American hostility was not restricted to verbal denunciations. In May 1995, the United States imposed an economic embargo on trade with Iran, as the means to convince its government to modify its policy. More specifically, it was stated, Washington wished thus to pressure Iran to end its involvement in international terrorism and to prevent its nuclearization. An executive order banned all USA trade with and investment in Iran, including the purchase of Iranian oil by American companies abroad. Among the more specific American indictments were Iran’s “active support for and sponsorship of terrorism,” supporting opposition groups seeking to subvert secular regimes in the Muslim world, opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and support to Palestinian rejectionist movements. Iran was also blamed for pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction and the missile systems to deliver them and for being engaged in a conventional military build-up that threatens regional peace and stability. At home, Iran was castigated for abuses of human rights, particularly of political dissidents, women, and religious minorities.
After Khatami’s election in 1997, American officials sounded somewhat milder. They acknowledged a degree of change, in some (though not the most significant) elements in Iran’s ruling establishment. They also noted Iran’s importance and the significance of the change since Khatami’s election. But they expressed the will for authoritative dialogue, while refusing to compromise on their pre-conditions and continuing to criticize Iran’s policy in extremely harsh terms. In 1998 Iran was named one (of seven) governments that the State Department designated as state sponsors of international terrorism. Official statements then combined mild words with tough conditions and uncompromising benchmarks. Still, there was greater diversity and variety in the American statements. In summer 1998, Washington came out with extraordinary mild statements—a speech by Madeleine Albright (17 June) and President Clinton’s two days. On 12 April 1999 Clinton went one step further, recognizing that Iran has been subject of “quite a lot of abuse from various Western nations.” They “have a right to be angry” at something that the USA or those allied with it “did to you 50 or 60 or 100 or 150 years ago.” Clinton expressed the hope “to find some way to get dialogue.” Washington continued to wave the “stick” but also showed now the “carrot.” But much like Teheran, Washington, too, was expecting practical steps and viewed the ball as being in the Iranian court.
Still the United States did not seem to offer “concessions” to Khatami. Much of the optimism that Washington expressed upon his election and following the reformists’ victory in the 2000 Majlis elections has been evaporated following the crackdown on the reform camp thereafter. While President Bush seemed willing to reconsider his Iran policy, Washington was still waiting for signs of actual change from Iran. Although President Bush seemed initially to have sought a shorter extension of the ILSA act, a five-years extension was approved on 3 August 2001—two days before Khatami was scheduled to take his oath in Majlis.
The Bush Administration turned adamant in its demand for actual change in Iran after September 11. In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush explicitly included Iran in his “axis of evil.” And in July 2002, he attacked the “unelected people who are the real rulers of Iran” while acknowledging the popular Iranian urge for reform and vowing that as they move toward a future defined by greater freedom, Iranians will have “no better friend” than the USA. This unequivocal American stance came as an unpleasant surprise to Iran’s rulers, touching sensitive nerves. This was America’s version of “critical dialogue” – extremely critical of “the unelected few” while offering an olive branch to the elected-reformist representatives.
This attitude appeared to be based on several foundations:
• Recognition that significant bodies of opinion in Iran favor sweeping reform, that young people are massively in favor of change, and that there are similar trends among other strata of society;
• The assumption, implicit in the declaration that change in Iran should—and could—come from within, that the USA cannot impose change, as it tried to do in the past in Iran and more recently in Iraq, but that it may help by offering encouragement to the Iranian public, which has acted in deciding its own fate over the past century and which does desire liberalization;
• Disappointment with Khatami, who has thus far failed to translate his inner desires into policy, and the recognition that, in the current reality, the “unelected” remain effectively in charge;
• The understanding that Iran’s opposition should be neutralized as long as the crisis in Iraq continued.
Washington continued to pressure Iran even as the war was raging on the fronts. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf stated (19 March 2003) that Iran presents a “proliferation problem.” It “has a sizable, heretofore clandestine, effort to acquire capabilities that makes sense only as part of an effort to produce fissile material for weapons.” The USA, he said, expects Iran to end its clandestine nuclear weapons programs and is “determined to do what it takes to push back” Iranian efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capabilities. WMD, terrorism and Iran’s opposition to Palestinian-Israel peace, remain its main concerns.
Foreign observers viewed the USA’s statement on 11 March 2005 which offered Iran incentives in return of a change in its nuclear program (i.e., to drop the veto of Iran's candidacy for the World Trade Organization, and permitting it to purchase spare parts for civilian airplanes), as significant signs of change. Still, one day earlier, President Bush extended the sanctions on Iran for another year and harsh statements continued to be raised. Iran’s nuclear program remains the major concern for the USA, and was a focal point in the discussions that the Israeli Prime Minister held in the USA in April 2005. Moreover, while in Bush’s first Administration there were significant differences in the approach of key officials in Washington, since his re-election the harsh stance gained supremacy. Washington seems determined not to let Iran stand against its larger schemes in the Middle East, though it is not yet clear how it intends to secure such goals.
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