Since gaining power, the Islamic regime has perceived the United States as “Great Satan.” Notwithstanding occasional outbursts of pragmatic statements, by and large this harsh attitude continues to characterize the Iranian approach.
Tehran views the USA as the prime cause of world’s evils, the symbol of arrogance and the source of Iran’s misery. It harmed Iran domestically (e.g., its exploitation under the Shah, economic sanctions, its support for the Iranian opposition and its “cultural onslaught”) and regionally (e.g., supporting Iraq in its war with Iran, its Gulf policy, supporting Israel, hostility toward Islamist movements and pressuring Europe to act against Iran). More recently, the USA's war against terrorism, its inclusion of Iran in its axis-of-evil list, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (along its influence in other parts of its borders—from Turkey to the Muslim republics of the former USSR to the Gulf—were sources for concern for Iran. The USA campaign against Iran's nuclear program and its policy in Iraq added to the threat perceived by Iran. It viewed American policy as aimed at dismantling the Islamic regime, weaken the world of Islam and harm Iranians and Muslims worldwide—America was thus the "archenemy of Iran and Islam." Ahmad Jannati made the unyielding conservatives’ approach clear, depicting the USA as the 'wolf' and Iran as the innocent 'sheep.' “Showing mercy to the wolf,” he said, is unlikely to satisfy the wolf nor to rescue the sheep. This animosity remained one of Iran’s most forceful symbols, raised “to a near religion.” Retreat from such an entrenched attitude proved extremely difficult and advocacy for a more accommodating view politically risky.
The sobering realities of the damage caused by the mutual hostility had led some intellectuals—and probably officials too—to reconsider a milder attitude, even though such views were rarely exposed publicly. A significant change in rhetoric became evident during the Iran-Iraq war, gaining force in the early 1990s (following Khomeini's death and the disintegration of the USSR, the USA-led war against Iraq in 1991 and the breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace–process). Thus, in an article in Ettela’at (26 April 1990) Rafsanjani’s Vice-President Mohajerani advocated some kind of dialogue with the USA. At that time, this was probably the most moderate public statement by a prominent Iranian official to support dialogue, almost explicitly. Not to engage in dialogue, Mohajerani wrote, was against Iran's interests. A letter by Majlis deputy Sa‘id Raja’i Khorasani to Ayatollah Khamene’i (29 November 1992), advocating better relations with the USA, generated public furor when it was disclosed a year later. Just before President Clinton entered office, the Tehran Times (20 January 1993) offered him an olive branch. “Any sign of goodwill will be responded to by goodwill from the Iranian side,” it wrote, adding that it hoped that the new American president would “take advantage of this golden opportunity.”
Still, the most significant steps towards smoothing the atmosphere were made after Khatami’s election in 1997. Greater segments of Iranian society seemed by then tired of the old slogans and opted for change. The resolute opposition by the conservatives did not allow a breakthrough, but support for a dialogue was no longer taboo. Khatami took the lead in stressing the advisability of removing tensions (détente). He went as far as to express appreciation for the achievements of western culture and deemed it impossible, and unwise, to cut off Iran from the outside world. When sworn in, he reaffirmed his campaign pledges, offering dialogue as a mechanism for removing misunderstandings between nations. Khatami went on to signal Iran’s willingness to open a new chapter in its relations with the USA—more explicitly and specifically—in an interview with CNN in January 1998. The issues he then raised, the terminology used, and the overall approach, were unusually moderate. While the hard-liners used the metaphor of the ‘wolf’ and ‘sheep’ to characterize the relation between the USA and Iran, reformists, while still viewing the USA as the ‘wolf’, have presented Iran as the ‘lion’—a metaphor used to justify a dialogue from a position of strength.
Yet, whatever pragmatic statements Khatami made were offset by hard-line messages by the conservatives. They dismissed supporters of a dialogue as misguided, superficial and naive, failing to perceive the enemy’s real intentions. They combined the rejection of President Clinton’s offer of good will with harsh accusations against Khatami and his associates.
While pragmatists and conservatives differed in their perception of the benefits of relations, they were united in expecting the USA to take the first (and practical) step in removing tension. Iranians were especially infuriated by accusations of supporting terrorism. They charged the USA for being itself behind numerous crises in the world, imposed wars, conspiracies and regime toppling, while Iran was a victim of terrorism. Iran’s attitude to the war in Iraq also remained intricate and multifaceted. For the conservatives, the war provided an opportunity to unmask the “true face” of the USA.
Practical steps toward dialogue have so far been hesitant, slow and limited. Still, some important strides were made, such as the visit to Iran of an American wrestling team in February 1998, the visit of Iranian wrestlers to the USA in April 1998, and the Iran–USA World Cup soccer game in France. While economic dealings were evident much before, in 1999 both sides confirmed that they communicated messages through third-parties. On the eve of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq this became even more evident. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer (22 April 2003) verified the existence of such communications but was vague about them. Defusing tension gained greater support among the Iranian people, and voicing support for restoring ties was no longer taboo.
In a remarkable pre-war interview, which provoked a heated debate when it was published on 12 April 2003, Rafsanjani related to the theoretical possibility of restoring ties with the USA. Intricate issues, he then said, should be brought to the Expediency Council (chaired by him) to pass final judgment. Rafsanjani grieved that in the past Iran had missed numerous opportunities. Now, he said, our officials are more skilled and ripe, possessing better understanding of worldly affairs to make fresh decisions—based on prudence. Relations with the USA, he added, are not general-strategic questions, but a specific-tactical one—over which officials could make new decisions. Moreover, he stressed, “Our ideology is flexible.” Rafsanjani did not hide his inherent distrust of the USA and its intentions. Yet, Iran’s desire for revenge, he warned, should not lead us to drive the region from a frying pan into the fire (Rahbord 27, Spring 2003).
On 11 March 2005 the USA came out with what has been viewed by observers as a milder approach. Washington offered “incentives” to Iran—to drop its veto of Iran's candidacy for the World Trade Organization, allowing it to purchase spare parts for civilian airplanes—in return of Iran's changing its nuclear program. Iran viewed such offers as “ridiculous,” which in any case could not be viewed as "confidence-building" measures. Iran, its spokesmen said is entitled to be members of WTO, and has the right to purchase spare parts for civilian airplanes. In any case, they added, no pressure or incentive could prevent Iran from pursuing its legitimate-civilian nuclear program. On their part, they expected practical evidences for real change in major areas of their own concern: unfreezing Iranian assets kept in USA banks since the hostage crisis, lifting sanctions on Iran, and reversing the hostile policy towards Iran. Thus, even if there seem to be significant changes, the gap between the two countries continue to remain wide. Harsh mutual statements continued to be aired.
Yet, as far as the USA is concerned, it takes more than a few words in an interview to prove a genuine change in Iran. At this stage, and with the power they have demonstrated, they were expecting actual change in areas of their major concern—terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and attitudes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, of course, their policy in Iraq. Both for Iran and the USA a demonstration of dramatic change remained complex. In a way they both used their lack of relations as an indication of their prestige. Iran’s anti-American stance remained a major symbol of the revolution, and deviating from it proved extremely difficult. As far as Khatami is concerned the main question is not his aim but his ability to produce a breakthrough. Khamene’i and the conservatives may be able to so, but they do not yet seem willing to take such a bold step.
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