The crisis in Lebanon sparked off by the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and the subsequent movements toward Syrian troop withdrawal from the country is part of a wider struggle over the Middle East. It is part of an aggressive attempt of the Bush government, in close alliance with Israel, to re-make the region to serve their joint interests. This project is driven by an alliance of the US neo-cons (who view American and Israeli interests as identical) with the arms and oilmen--headed by Bush and Cheney. This ruling group differs fundamentally from the mainstream US establishment which used to value Middle East stability as being in America's national interest and hence applauded Syria's ending of the Lebanese civil war and its stabilizing role in Lebanon. The current rulers in Washington are quite willing to de-stabilize the Middle East in order to establish hegemony. Their aims can be realized by military conquest, as in Iraq, but also by exploiting, as past imperial powers have done, the multiple cleavages that riddle the Arab-Islamic world. They seek to exploit, as the US has traditionally done, rivalries between the region’s states, now aiming to pit Lebanon against Syria. But, what is now different is that they also seek to aggressively exploit cleavages within Middle East states under the ideological banner of democratization; hence they are quite willing to jeopardize Lebanon’s (and Syria’s) hard-won stability by exploiting sectarian rivalries, much as they have done in Iraq. Patriotism used to be the “last refuge of scoundrels;” today democratization is used as a tool in the power struggle being waged by Washington over control of the Middle East.
Syria, along with Iran and Hizbollah, are the only remaining independent forces that remain in defiance of Washington and are hence the targets of continuing pressure. Syria and Iran have a long-standing alliance and jointly sponsor Hizbollah. Should Shiite power become a reality in Iraq, the prospect of a "Shiite arc" stretching from Lebanon to Iran, would be an unmovable obstacle to US-Israeli hegemony. Although Syria is secular and has a Sunni majority, its ruling Alawis shares some affinities, as a minority group, with the Shia and it has a long-standing alliance with Iran against what both see as imperialism. Syria's position in Lebanon was identified as a weak spot in this potential axis that could be attacked.
Syria has major strategic interests in Lebanon; its forces there represent a deterrent to any Israeli military attack on Syria’s western flank. Part of Syria’s bargaining hand with Israel over the Golan Heights turns on its ability to deliver Lebanon into a peace settlement or keep it out of one of which Damascus does not approve. Syria also has economic stakes in Lebanon including corrupt exactions its security forces make on business deals, the financing provided by Lebanese banks to the Syrian economy, joint business ventures, and the jobs of as many as a million Syrian workers whose remittances home are crucial to Syria’s economy.
A chain of events in Lebanon allowed Washington to strike a major blow at Syria which seemingly fell into a trap being prepared for it. Apparently intent on heading off any challenges to its control over Lebanon, Syria sought to engineer a change in the Lebanese constitution allowing its main Lebanese ally, Emile Lahoud, to assume another term as President. Lahoud is heir to the Shihabist tradition among Maronites that see Lebanon as Arab and the presidency as not properly an instrument of Maronite interests; this and his close alignment with Syria meant he has little popularity in the Maronite community but, as ex-head of the Lebanese army, he controls the security establishment in that country. Lahoud's rivals, the rightwing Maronites, Hariri and the Druze leader, Walid Junblatt objected to a new presidential term. Hariri apparently enlisted France's Chirac, a close friend, who formed a tactical alliance with the US in the UN Security Council to sneak through a resolution (1554) calling on Syria to withdraw from the country and for Hizbollah to disarm.
Did Syria engineer Hariri's assassination? Syria was irritated by Hariri's maneuverings, and the hearsay is that Bashar al-Asad threatened him. But Hariri had had similar clashes with Damascus in the past that had been settled by compromise. The two had a shared interest in Lebanese stability. Moreover, Hariri was pivotal to the economic stability of Lebanon in which Damascus had a big stake. As prime Minister and Lebanon’s biggest entrepreneur, Hariri had deeply indebted Lebanon to pay for the post-civil-war reconstruction of Beirut; he alone had the international and business credibility to rescue the country from the financial hole in which his policies had put it. In addition, given the checks and balances in the Lebanese political system, it was never likely that Hariri could mount a major challenge to Syria even if he wanted to. The struggle between the pro-Damascus Lebanese establishment and the opposition was centred, at the time of Hariri’s death, on the up-coming parliamentary elections and the government’s gerrymandering of electoral district was set both to appease Christian politicians and to undermine the likelihood of any cross-sectarian coalition, led by Hariri or others, coming together against the pro-Syrian Lebanese ruling group.
While the struggle for Lebanon is being depicted as a state-to-state one between a Lebanon seeking freedom and an overbearing Damascus, under the surface it has other dimensions. Dense economic and patronage ties cut across the borders of the two countries. When Syrian Vice President Khaddam and former Chief of Staff Shihabi were in charge in Lebanon, they built close ties with Hariri and also opposition leader Walid Junblatt. The take over of the Lebanon file by Bashar al-Asad constituted another network, as Bashar sponsored the presidency of Emile Lahoud (while also consolidating closer ties with Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Some believe the rivalries between the two patronage networks turned nasty, and that possibly some rogue figure in the Lebanese or Syrian intelligence apparatus was responsible for the killing.
From the point of view of what would be rational Syrian behavior it seems inconceivable that any Syrian leader would not have anticipated the way the Hariri killing would be used, as it has been, against Syria; if one invokes the traditional legal principle quo bono (who benefits), the killing was tailor-made to serve the interest of the US neo-cons. Nevertheless, many are willing to believe in Syrian guilt, sparking an enormous backlash that has greatly weakened Syria's position in Lebanon. The killing stimulated a cross-sectarian alliance against Syria, bringing together the Sunnis (Hariri's constituency) with the rightwing Maronites and Druze and putting Lebanese Shia on the defensive. Saudi Arabia, another of Hariri's patrons, but also a traditional Syrian ally, added its voice to those demanding Syrian withdrawal. Europe and Washington were in accord and Syria found itself without allies. Faced with this coalition of forces, Damascus has apparently lost its nerve and is conceding withdrawal. Concessions to the neo-cons are, however, only likely to whet their appetite for more--ultimately for regime change in Damascus and the disarmament of Hizbollah.
The stance of Hizbollah will be pivotal for future developments. Hizbollah is not only the best organized political force in Lebanon, but it speaks, along with its secular counterpart Amal, also Syrian-aligned, for the Shia, the largest single community in Lebanon; its missile-armed military wing in south Lebanon is also the main Lebanese—and Syrian--deterrent force against Israel. The Americans and Israel would like to destroy or at least disarm Hizbollah; the Lebanese opposition to Syria hopes to split Hizbollah from its Syrian alliance. Both parties know that as long as Hizbollah’s power remains intact and its interests congruent with those of Damascus, no fundamental Westward re-orientation of Lebanon’s identity and foreign policy is likely. And Syrian interests will continue to carry some weight in Lebanon.
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