This paper examines the Israeli approach towards the Iranian challenge facing it. Iran’s challenge emanate from Iran’s Islamic dogma, its support for Islamist movements (mainly in Lebanon and among the Palestinians) and armament. In fact, the Islamic components of Iranian rhetoric have colored the Arab-Israeli conflict in a radically different light: transforming it into a religious crusade as opposed to a political-national conflict. Iran’s opposition to the peace process added to the challenge, and its attempts to acquire WMD and the missile technology to deliver them, are viewed as an existential threat by Israel.
While the credo “Death to Israel” represented the Iranian policy since its first days, during the 1980s the “Iranian threat” did not generate much attention in Israel. Iran’s preoccupation with its domestic difficulties and tension with the outside world, coupled with its war with Iraq (1980-1988) made Iran appear less threatening. For its part, Israel seemed more concerned then with the looming danger of Iraq than with Iran, as is evinced by Israel’s attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and its arms deals with Iran in the mid-1980s. Israel also seemed to believe then, that following the Iran-Iraq War, they would both focus on domestic rehabilitation, thus diminishing their threat to Israel.
The “Iranian threat” turned a major security issue since the early 1990s. By then, it was known that Iran initiated a comprehensive military buildup effort, a nuclear and a long-range missile program. The breakthrough in the peace process (1993), Iran’s anti-peace policy and its support for the Hizballah and Palestinian Islamists, positioned it at the forefront of Israel’s enemy list. Israel intensified then its international activities, mainly pressuring Washington to harden its attitude towards Iran. Prime Minister Rabin missed no opportunity to stress the “Iranian danger.” He believed that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would change the balance of power in the Middle East and undermine the peace process. His close contact with the White House was used to pressure Washington to adopt a firm policy against Iran. The US “Dual containment” and the subsequent sanctions were in line with Israeli interests. All subsequent Israeli Prime Ministers shared similar concerns, and the IDF (mainly the Intelligence and Air Force) and segments of the defense ministry advocated a firm anti-Iranian stance. Some even recommended a preemptive strike against its military installations. In fact, when Israel received the F-15-I attack jetfighters (1998), its media emphasized – using a threatening language – that their range suffice to hit Iran.
The proponents of harsh arguments seemed to share the following main convictions:
Still, in the late 1990s, when a few cracks became visible in the attitude of some Iranians, more nuanced expressions could also be detected in Israeli responses, with some Israelis suggesting to tune down the anti-Iranian rhetoric. Consequently, a symbolic change was approved: Iran was classified as a threat, not as an enemy. Officials were also advised to avoid making public statements regarding Iran (which usually fell on deaf ears). While Israel had long stressed that it did not have a conflict with Iranian people or with Islam, some officials now came close to stating that Israel did not oppose the Islamic regime, only its policy. Interestingly, upon assuming responsibility as the Commander of Air Force (July 2000), Dan Halutz, usually known for his hawkish stance, challenged the view “that Israel is the prime target of Iran” or that Iran is “heading our enemies.” He said that if the Palestinian will make peace with Israel, “the Iranians, too, might consider making peace with Israel.” Mossad Chief Ephraim Halevi, while warning against the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, seemed to recommend gently paving road to reach out to Iran’s reformers. In December 2001, he said that there were “covert messages” from Iran “of the possibility of reconciliation.” Iran, added Ilan Mizrakhi, shortly after leaving office as Deputy Chief of the Mossad (2003), presents the main existential threat to Israel. Yet, he added in an uncharacteristic manner: “Iran of 2003 is not Khomeini’s Iran. It is not another Middle Eastern dictatorship. It is different. Iran is a country with tradition and it still has democratic expressions. … The masses have a say [there]. … Moreover, the Iranian citizen is primarily concerned with his day-to-day problems, not with the destruction of distant Israel.” Acknowledging “their pragmatism in international relations,” Mizrakhi added that in their policy towards Israel, too, the Iranians “recognize the limits.”
The proponents of a milder approach based their arguments on the following reasoning:
Yet, with the growing power of Iran’s conservatives and the news of its nuclear program, Israeli rhetoric turned acerbic again. Meeting President Bush (July 2003), Ariel Sharon provided “grim warning” that Iran is much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than intelligence services believed and warned of a possible “nuclear holocaust.” He named Iran (October) as the “main threat to Israel.” Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz cautioned (November) of Iran’s integrating nuclear capability with its newly developed long-range missile technology. Developing nuclear weapons may turn Iran into an existential threat to Israel, Mossad Chief Meir Dagan added (in November 2003).
Iran’s attempts to gain nuclear power remain a major concern for Israel. Jerusalem views this as a challenge for the free world, and expects the US and Europe to prevent it. Its policy was best illustrated by Dan Haloutz (before his nomination as the next Chief-of-Staff): Israel should assume that preventing Iran’s access to nuclear weapon is the problem of the world, until it realizes that the world fails to fulfill such a task.
Israeli attitude, thus, seems to mirror the Iranian policy. Even following the 1979 revolution Israel did not cut diplomatic relations – in fact, its diplomats continued to be stationed there even after Khomeini’s takeover. Even now, most Israelis believe that the two countries would eventually have peaceful relations. When reformists gained greater power in Iran, Israeli changed its rhetoric as well. Changing the current hostile “relations” therefore seems to depend primarily on Iran’s changing its attitude (rhetoric at home, support for Islamism) and abandoning its armament. In the meantime, harsh statements persist and rumors of a possible Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear installations continue to be raised occasionally.
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