Some American and Iraqi officials believe they are witnessing the beginning of the end of the insurgency.
They cite as evidence that
There are, it is true, signs which point in this direction. And among the population generally, disgust at the brutal killing of foreigners and, above all, of Iraqi civilians has been apparent for some time.
But it is premature to speak of a turning-point. Violence is still commonplace; what has changed is that in recent weeks it has been directed at Iraqis rather than Americans. This is leading some analysts to speak of the insurgency turning inwards, increasingly becoming an inter-communal affair, with militant Sunnis striking out at Kurds and Shi’ites, in some cases provoking retaliation. This in turn is fuelling fears of a civil war.
It is in this context that the elections of 30 January – and the long period of political paralysis which followed them – should be viewed. The prolonged squabbling among the various political factions has deprived the elections of some of their lustre. In part, it has been a familiar story of the victors squabbling over the political spoils. But the arguments have also been about much more – about what sort of state post-Saddam Iraq should be.
The Shi’ites emerged dominant from the elections and now want to cement this unprecedented achievement by holding onto many of the top jobs, by ensuring respect for Islam and Islamic values in the new Iraq, and by preventing the Kurds from carving out a breakaway state embracing the oil-rich region of Kirkuk.
The Kurds, for their part, are convinced they have a never-to-be-repeated chance to cement their claim to a state of their own – with Kirkuk as its capital. This explains their stubbornness in the negotiations to form a new government.
Meanwhile among the minority Sunnis, many now regret their decision to boycott the poll and want belatedly to join the political game. Their strongest card is that, without their political participation, there is little chance of eventually ending the insurgency. Psychologically, however, their wounded pride will not allow them to accept crumbs from the victors’ table – in other words, mere token representation in the new political order. Moreover, complicating matters is the fact that the Sunnis are badly divided. The question of who can credibly speak for them is unresolved.
The elections and their aftermath have shown that the new Iraqi politics is very much a communal affair. Some analysts argue this is inevitable: when a dictatorship of several decades is removed, people have no option but to revert to their primordial loyalties. Nevertheless it is equally arguable that US policies have, wittingly or unwittingly, reinforced a tendency which will be as damaging for Iraq as it was for post-communist Yugoslavia.
Iraq’s new political leaders pay lip-service to the idea of a united Iraqi nation, but in practice act to undermine it. Many Iraqis are uncomfortable with a new political climate in which nationalism has little meaning since Iraqis are increasingly retreating (willingly or in many cases unwillingly) into their communal boxes.
Divisions between Arab and Kurd, and between Sunni and Shia, have sharpened – a trend which can be reversed only by swift progress towards ending the violence, and by the emergence of imaginative and courageous political leadership. At present, neither is evident.
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