Suddenly “soft power” is back.
Under Condoleezza Rice, the US State Department is becoming the principal vehicle of US foreign policy – something it conspicuously was not under Colin Powell. Is this a change of substance, or merely one of style? It is potentially both.
It is not hard to see the underlying reason for the change. The American president and his advisers are beginning to think about his place in the history books. He wants to be remembered as a president who spread freedom rather than as the man who stumbled into a controversial and costly war.
This will require more than well-crafted speeches about the “march of freedom” and the battle against “outposts of tyranny”. It will require sustained damage limitation or, in plain language, correcting the (unacknowledged) mistakes of the first term.
To achieve this, policy-makers in Washington have identified a cluster of inter-related issues which now have high priority – and which, crucially, require a commitment to creative, multilateralist thinking:
While important in and of themselves, these issues are also necessary elements in achieving success in the “war on terror”.
All this shifts the emphasis from war to diplomacy, and hence from the Pentagon to the State Department. The neo-cons have a consolation prize: they view the new push for democracy as proof that the president has adopted at least one important part of their agenda. But overall they have been marginalised. Even the shift of two prominent neo-cons – Paul Wolfowitz to the World Bank and John Bolton to the UN – reflects the trend. The controversy surrounding their re-assignment has obscured the fact that it strengthens the hand of the “new pragmatists” led by Condoleezza Rice.
But will a more coherent foreign policy also be a successful foreign policy?
A series of challenges lie in wait on all fronts. Will the situation in Iraq allow for a gradual withdrawal of US troops? Supposing European negotiations with Iran come to nothing? Can America realistically expect to repair its damaged image in the Muslim world? Will the Palestinians accept what is shaping up to be a partial – rather than comprehensive – settlement with Israel? And what if predictions of the blossoming of democracy prove premature?
The new approach undoubtedly offers short-term gains. It looks set to end the bitter internal feuding which hobbled decision-making in the first term. It has already been welcomed by America’s allies, who feel commitment to a sensible multilateralist agenda (and in particular to Middle East peacemaking) is long overdue. And it may help to dispel the impression of a relentlessly war-mongering administration.
Less clear is whether the new team can achieve tangible success, rather than merely damage limitation, over the next four years.
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