The notable domestic and regional changes resulted, over time, in greater realism and emphasis on national interests in Iranian domestic and foreign policy. Yet, its inherent hostility towards Israel remained excessively uncompromising. For Tehran, Israel remained the enemy of Iran and Islam, and a threat to mankind. “Death to Israel” thus remained a central theme in its creed. Whatever signs of a milder approach could be discerned in the 1990s was frustrated following the conservatives’ offensive on the pro-reform camp (since Spring 2000), the Palestinian Intifada (Fall 2000) and the American war against terrorism (following September 11, 2001).
Iran and Israel do not share common borders, have had no wars between them and have no territorial claims on each other. Moreover, under the old regime they formed a strategic alliance. This period of close ties had come to an abrupt end with the ascendancy of the Islamic regime. Among all the countries found blameworthy by Iran, Israel was indicted on more counts than any other. Iran's involvement in Lebanon and its moral, political and logistical support for Islamist movements (Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad) made it more directly involved in the Arab-Israeli scene. More recently, its attempts (actual or alleged) to purchase and develop weapons of mass destruction and the missile technology to deliver them, are viewed as the most serious—existential—challenge by Israel.
Iran’s hostile attitude has its roots in the revolutionary dogma and, in the view of the ruling elite, thus far there have not been sufficient considerations to incite a retreat from it. In fact, Iran rejection of Israel’s right to exist became one of the fundamental tenets of its ideological creed. Its policy reflected a deep sense of religious mission, identification with the Palestinian cause and opposition to Israel and its policies. Significant religious elements were instilled into its arguments. Israel’s relations with the Shah were also held against it. Animosity towards Islam and hostility to Iran were thus inter-related, as was the rejection of Israel for its own demerits, and for serving imperialism. The U.S. anti-Iranian policy (“dual containment,” sanctions and the recent campaign against its nuclearization) was also attributed to Israel, Zionism and Jewish capitalism.
In this case, so far, ideological hostility did not seem to conflict with the pragmatic interests of the state. Tehran’s firm stance even seemed to offer some advantages. With other rejectionist states having withdrawn from the anti-Israel front by the early 1990s (such as Iraq and Libya), Iran’s leadership of the camp could enhance its credentials as a major Islamic power. Moreover, because of its self-view as the major center of anti-American politics, Tehran believed it had a duty to oppose any American-led initiatives. It also viewed itself as the major foe of “America’s unlawful son” (Israel) and felt its responsibility to resist any proposal aimed at legitimizing its existence. Iran also viewed the success of the Palestinian Islamists—and Hizballah—as a tribute to its revolution and evidence of its Islamic centrality. No less important, all these benefits were gained for a relatively low price. Moreover, hostility to Israel provided a major area of agreement between the different domestic trends. Finally, Iran was also concerned with the growing power of Israel following the disintegration of the USSR, and viewed its expanding ties with Turkey and its influence in Central Asia and Azerbaijan with great concern. Thus, in a way, Iran's state interest seemed to reinforce the hostile revolutionary attitude rather than balancing it—as was the case in many other policy areas.
Over time there were some signs of a more diversified tone in the approach of several Iranians even on this issue. Milder expressions were infrequent, were usually voiced by people with no official standing, and were customarily coupled with considerable reservations. Yet, they revealed some cracks in the hitherto fortified front against Israel and the peace process. Some even questioned the advisability of Iran’s harsh hostility, while the Palestinians themselves were negotiating for peace with Israel. Milder views were made public mainly since the Oslo Accord (1993), expressed more frequently following Khatami’s election (1997), reaching a new peak in 1999, when the reform trend had reached a new height. It has reversed, however, since 2000.
Two main developments—the offensive against the reform camp and the Palestinian Intifada—frustrated then whatever signs of softening could be discerned. The radical voice thus turned harsher and louder. More recent developments—the events following September 11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—had produced even harsher attitude to Israel. Iranians believe that Israel was behind the American move to include Iran in its list of “axis of evil” (January 2002) and that the war in Iraq was also aimed to serve its interests. Israel, they maintained, was also behind the American adamant criticism against Iran and its demand for actual policy change. Most significantly, it was viewed as the power behind the campaign against its nuclear program. Israel on its part, did not hide its attempts to inflame anti-Iranian sentiments in Washington. Thus, the general tone remains extremely hostile. The improved atmosphere in Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab front following the death of Chairman Arafat, resulted in even harsher Iranian attitudes, but its continuation may encourage milder (non-official) voices in the longer run.
So far, however, the momentous change in Iranian politics did not lead to any significant change in its attitude to Israel. That animosity to Israel had become the main tenet in Iran’s revolutionary creed, made it even more difficult to discard. The milder voices may have greater support within society than what is reflected in the official policy, but such circles lacked the power to lead to a policy change. The conservatives, who control key decision-making machineries, may have been able to produce a change, but they seemed unwilling to take such a bold step.
To produce a meaningful change two main conditions seem imperative: an Iranian incentive to reshape policy and a leadership capable of advancing such a goal; and a significant change in Israeli-Palestinian relations. In both areas, the situation so far has not been conducive to produce a breakthrough in Iranian policy. Still, in spite of intense anti-Israeli indoctrination, for most Iranians, Israel remains a distant foe, with their main concern focusing on Iran’s inner situation and in its immediate neighborhood. Also, in the final analysis, Tehran is not a major player in the Israeli-Palestinian scene, although it carries some power to obstruct the peace-process (through extremists Palestinian and Lebanese movements).
In the final analysis, thus, more than the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seem to depend on any particular Iranian policy; the resolution of such a conflict may have—in the longer run—a significant influence on the attitude of larger segments of the Iranian society towards Israel. With the recent progress in the Israeli-Palestinian scene—and the subsequent opposition from extremists on both sides—Israel and the Palestinians are facing a grave task: to pursue the process of peace-making to resolve their own conflict and thus create a better atmosphere in the entire region.
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