The stirrings of ‘people power’ on the streets of Beirut…elections in Iraq, the Palestinian territories and even Saudi Arabia…the decision by Egypt’s President Mubarak to open up presidential elections to competition…
Is democracy at last breaking out in the Arab world?
There is certainly a new buzz of expectation and a feeling that the region is heading into uncharted waters.
There is a widely-shared desire for change, and in some parts of the region a greater readiness to give voice to that desire. But at the same time it is not self-evident that new pressures -- from within and from without -- will lead to democratic outcomes.
The Palestinian elections which brought to power Mahmoud Abbas showed the continuing power of the Fatah “old guard” – which closed ranks behind his candidacy – rather than the emergence of new democratic forces.
Developments in Saudi Arabia and Egypt are best seen as limited moves designed to stave off pressures for change without undermining the ruling elites in either country.
Observers expect President Mubarak to win another term in office without difficulty. In other words, no serious challenger will be allowed to come forward.
As for the Saudi elections, they will be meaningful only if they lead over time to a real opening-up of the political system.
Events in Lebanon, however, are of a different kind. Regardless of whether they lead to democracy in Lebanon, or for that matter in Syria, they are likely to influence the region in significant ways.
A Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, almost unthinkable at the beginning of this year, is now highly likely. And if it happens, anti-Syrian protestors in Beirut – and the Bush administration in Washington – will seize on it as proof of a newly resurgent “people power” in the Middle East.
In fact, matters are not so simple.
A Syrian pullout, ending a 30-year military presence in Lebanon, will have unpredictable consequences for both countries.
There is a danger that, once free from Syrian hegemony, the Lebanese may find it hard to come up with a workable political consensus. A return to civil war is unlikely, but there may be a revival of communal tensions – and this would have destabilising effects.
As for Syria itself, its regional position is now gravely weakened. In its confrontation with Israel, it relied on Lebanon as a bargaining-chip. Now it is losing the bargaining-chip and gaining nothing in return.
Israel’s Prime Minister Sharon will have less incentive to negotiate over the return over the Golan Heights, which Israel captured from Syria in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.
There are two other implications for Bashar al-Assad and his Damascus regime.
First, pro-democracy activists in Syria – encouraged by events in Beirut -- are likely to become increasingly assertive. Bashar will encounter one set of difficulties if he allows them greater freedom of expression – another set of difficulties if he clamps down on dissent.
Second, the Syrian “old guard” are unlikely to forgive a president whom they regard as a political novice for losing Lebanon, which they view as an important strategic asset.
For the moment, events in Lebanon are boosting the position of Syria’s hard-line (“neo-con”) critics in Washington. The neo-cons do not disguise their desire for “regime change” in Damascus.
But what are the intentions of President Bush and his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice? On Syria, as on Iran, their policy is essentially one of reacting to events, and it is far from clear that they have a coherent plan or a long-term vision.
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