All the players in the Iraq drama face important tests in the aftermath of the elections on 30 January.
It was, without doubt, significant that 8.5 million Iraqis took part, defying threats to their physical security. Nevertheless, if the country is to escape from the current quagmire, all the parties – Iraqi and non-Iraqi – will have to take advantage of the opportunity which the elections open up.
They represent, first, a chance for fresh political leadership. This will require consensus-building within and between the different political factions. And it will require, above all, that the main beneficiaries of the elections – the Shi’ites and the Kurds – display political maturity.
Second, if the elections are exploited, they could, potentially, pave the way for an end to the insurgency – and, no less important, the eventual withdrawal of American and other foreign forces.
But will the moment of opportunity be seized?
As ever in post-war Iraq, three big tasks – political rebirth, economic recovery, and control of security – are tightly entangled.
On the political front, the Shi’ite leaders who are likely to dominate the new government will have to persuade the Iraqi people that they intend to govern on behalf of the whole nation, not just their own community.
That means, first and foremost, reassuring the Sunni minority.
For the most part, the Sunnis – through fear or anger – stayed away from the polling stations. Now they need to be involved in the new government; in the task of drawing up a new constitution; and in finding a way to end the insurgency.
Also needing reassurance are Iraqi secularists – whether Shi’ite, Sunni, or Kurd – who fear the creeping “Islamisation” of the country. In particular, the new constitution will need to spell out whether Islam should be “a” source of legislation or “the” source. This is highly sensitive.
It seems likely the new Shi’ite leaders – guided from the sidelines by the Shi’ite spiritual leader Ayatollah Sistani – will indeed seek a path of national reconciliation. Their biggest challenges, however, may lie in the two other key areas – economy and security. The failure to ensure basic services, improve infrastructure, and generate more jobs is one of the main causes of anger and alienation among the Iraqi people. With morale high following the first free elections since the end of the Saddam tyranny, they may now have unrealistic hopes of the new government’s ability to deliver much-needed improvements to their daily lives.
The hardest challenge of all, however, will be to end (or at least curb) the insurgency based on Baghdad and the “Sunni triangle”.
The insurgency is now driven by two distinct agendas – the more “nationalist” agenda of aggrieved Sunnis, including present and former Baathists, and the “jihadi” agenda of Islamist militants led by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and others.
By denouncing democracy as “infidel”, Zarqawi may have shot himself in the foot. Eight and a half million Iraqi voters – some 58% of eligible voters – have in effect told the Jordanian militant he is living on another planet.
The government’s challenge is to exploit differences between “nationalist” and “jihadi” insurgents in order to marginalise the “jihadis” and draw the “nationalists” into negotiations. Here too Shi’ite leaders will need to show political wisdom. At least some members of a Shi’ite-led government may be inclined to be vindictive, rather than magnanimous, towards the Sunni insurgents – some of whom have not hesitated to target Shi’ite mosques and Shi’ite political and religious leaders.
Meanwhile, as the Bush administration settles in to its second term, there are signs it is reviewing its strategy in Iraq. It too has political, economic, and security challenges there.
It will need to be tactful in its dealings with an elected government anxious to be master in its own house. It will need to work with the new government to achieve tangible progress towards economic recovery. And, crucially, it will need to achieve much greater success than hitherto in building up new and professional Iraqi security forces. Only then can President Bush contemplate an “exit strategy” – something he is surely anxious to see under way before the end of his second term.
So will the opportunity be seized? It would be unwise to expect dramatic breakthroughs any time soon.
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