The Islamic revolution represented a new prototype of power seizure in modern Middle Eastern history, with a new political system, and a leadership with a new vision of the ideal Islamic society. In reality, however, expectations that revolutionary dogma would have a dramatic impact all over the region remain mostly unfulfilled, and significant changes were introduced in Iran’s revolutionary programs itself—in foreign relations as well as domestic policy. Consequently, Iran’s pursuit of its regional goals has so far been based on a mixture of ideology and realism. Here, too, with few exceptions, when ideology clashed with state interests, interests triumphed. As in domestic politics, this inherent tension between vision and reality has not generated clear-cut policies. Iranian regional policy has been dualistic, complex and intricate—a general trend of pragmatism coupled with radical measures. Although over time, the atmosphere in bilateral relations relaxed, Iran's association with most of its neighbors remains tense.
As the head of an opposition movement, Ayatollah Khomeini depicted a “new Iran” modeled on a purely Islamic design. Upon coming to power, therefore, the regime viewed its victory as a stage in, and an instrument of, a sweeping change in the Islamic world—an example for imitation by other Muslim communities. In reality, interests trumped doctrine, and policy combined ideology with inherent national interest. This trend began already at the regime’s inception and became more evident over time. How, for example, does the revolutionary assertion that no difference exists between Muslims of different ethnic or sectarian affiliations accord with the 1979 constitution, which states that only a Shi‘i of Iranian origin can be president? How can one reconcile the abhorrence of national divisions within the Muslim World with the insistence that the Gulf must be called Persian? Moreover, Khomeini did not exclude relations with Arab nationalist, and secular Ba‘thist Syria—now Iran’s main regional ally. In a way, the very name of the state—Islamic Republic of Iran—is a contradiction in terms. Its first part befits a government of the community of believers. The second limits it to a small part thereof—Iran. This has become even more evident since the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1988), Khomeini’s death (1989), and the demise of the USSR (1991).
Iran’s policy around its borders demonstrates the degree to which the regime’s politics have been shaped by national interests. This was evident in Iran’s lack of support for the Shi‘i and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq in 1991. Nor did Iran’s policy vis-à-vis its Afghan neighbors in the 1980s—or after the Taliban takeover—show any marked ideological purity. Also, the Iranian move in 1992 to ascertain its sovereignty over the three islands in the mouth of the Hormuz straits—Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs—confirmed that Iran’s policy was motivated primarily by realism—not dogma. Similarly, with regard to the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, Iran’s focus lay on expanding its interests rather than on winning souls. The Iranian approach to the Azeri-Armenian crisis best illustrates this self-interested attitude. While Iran officially adopted a neutral position and engaged in mediation in the Nagorno-Karabach conflict, eventually Iran served as an important supply route to Christian Armenia during its conflict with Shi'i Azerbaijan. In fact, Iran maintains its best relations in the Muslim republics of the former USSR with Tajikistan (which is culturally closest to Iran), and has the most tense relations with Azerbaijan—the only Shi'i republic among them. Clearly, Tehran valued good relations with Moscow (for political, economic and strategic purposes) more than with the Muslim republics. If ideology had dictated its priorities Tehran would have preferred ties with Central Asian peoples first, relations with their governments second, and ties with Moscow third. In fact, the scale of priorities was reversed.
Pragmatism manifested itself further following the general reformist mood of President Khatami’s election (1997). Khatami's program combined faith and state, and stressed the need to form rational policies to secure Iran’s national interests. His accent on “proper governance” and on preserving “interest” led to greater deviations from dogma. With the growth of the pragmatic trend (1997-2000), the atmosphere in Iran’s neighborhood has significantly improved (such as in its relations with Saudi Arabia, the littoral Gulf state and even Egypt and Turkey). Yet, whatever pragmatism Khatami advanced was “balanced” by the conservatives’ hard-line attitudes. For all practical purposes, the latter dictated Iran’s foreign outlook, preventing real détente in Iran's foreign policy.
Having limited leverage with the Arab states, Iran seemed more successful in its ties with Islamist movements, mainly Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. Still, judging by initial expectations, Iranian success was limited. Iran’s example has proved that its ideology can incite people against policies and rulers, but is a less potent tool for constructive solutions and effective governance. Indeed, the latter is a significant reason for its revolutionary creed’s limited appeal.
Finally, in regional diplomacy pragmatic attitudes went hand in hand with occasional outbursts of radical positions, such as in developing WMD and the missile technology for their delivery, supporting Hizballah and Hamas, and opposing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The reformists desire change, but lack the power to advance it; the conservatives have the power, but hitherto refuse to use it for significant reform.
Oddly, Iran’s position in the region has benefited from important U.S. “services.” In 1991 the American-led coalition defeated the Iraqi military and in 2003 the U.S. removed the regime of Saddam Husayn in the west, and in 2002 it destroyed the Taliban, Iran’s enemy to the east. In doing so, however, American troops now sit in threatening proximity to Iran, and the U.S.’s sphere of influence encircles it.
Viewed from Tehran, today’s Middle East is not what Iran envisioned at the dawn of the Islamic revolution. Indeed, the revolution’s impact on the region remains limited. Instead of an ideology driven policy, interests primarily dictated Iran’s regional approach. Neither has Iran become what its neighbors feared it would in 1979. Instead of initiating significant policies, Iran seems to respond to developments; it feels threatened no less than it threatens others. Yet, even after toning down dogma, Iran still lacks friendly relations with most of its neighbors. The attempt in recent years to defuse tension did not entirely remove distrust.
Today, Iranians view the developments in Iraq and Afghanistan as their two major concerns. Iran is “sandwiched” between two bordering Muslim states, which had posed a serious challenge to its national interests in the past and are now under American influence. The results of these conflicts will most affect Iran’s stance in the region. With such a troubled neighborhood, Israel and the Arab-Israeli (or Palestinian-Israeli) conflict seem far away. Yet Iran still seems determined to play an active role there.
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