Two days before schedule, the United States transferred authority for rule in Iraq to the interim Iraqi government. On that day, June 28th, the Coalition Provisional Authority headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer quietly disappeared and Bremer made a low-key exit for home. In its place, a new American embassy under the experienced diplomat and former ambassador to the United Nations John Negroponte took over. A four star U.S. army general, George Casey, was installed to head coalition military forces. And the 45 year-old Sunni tribal chief Ghazi Yawer and the 59 year-old Shia Ayad Allawi were appointed president and prime minister respectively.
Two consequences of this early turnover were immediate. The meeting of heads of state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Turkey was entirely overshadowed by the exchange of sovereignty. From the U.S. perspective, this was a very good thing. There was little good news for NATO. Afghanistan, where NATO is operating for the first time in its history out of the European region as an alliance as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was not going well. NATO’s Supreme Military Commander, General James Jones, had registered his concerns over the shortcomings in Afghanistan that had not provoked the alliance to send more needed capabilities. And French president Jacques Chirac categorically rejected NATO sending forces to Iraq to participate in rebuilding that state.
Those potential storms were completely overshadowed by news from Iraq. And that news suddenly shifted from the negative reporting of the earlier fifteen months prominently posted at the top of television broadcasts and page one of newspapers to more benign stories that no longer persistently grabbed the headlines. The reason was simple.
With the evaporation of the CPA and Baghdad’s daily press briefings, the media had little news to report. Ambassador Bremer was a visible target for pointed questions especially as violence in Iraq waxed. The new government placed an Iraqi face on point. The media was less interested. And the danger that existed outside the “green zone” in Baghdad made getting journalists into the field very risky. So, the perception was that events were improving in Iraq.
Globalization has made isolating events in any region virtually impossible. This interconnectivity has pluses and minuses. Among the pluses are positive effects such as those that ultimately led Libya’s Muramar Qaddaffi to give up his weapons of mass destruction. Negative effects were captured by the horror of September 11th and the image of the Twin Towers’ collapse.
The presidential campaign in the United States and the spate of commissions and investigations into the failures of U.S. and British intelligence services to deliver timely accurate assessments will carry over into events in the Middle East. Iraq, the global war on terror and who was responsible for September 11 will produce policy consequences for the region. Several will be discussed shortly. And as the November election in America approach, both President Bush and Senator Kerry will use events to support their candidacy and attack the other.
Meanwhile, the International Court in the Hague declared Israel’s security barrier or wall to divide Israel from Palestine as the last means to reduce terrorist attacks in violation of the norms of international law. Israel and the United States predictably dissented. But one upshot was the resignation of Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia on the grounds of corruption, growing turmoil in Gaza and resistance to reform. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat rejected the resignation. However, the prospect is for further unrest and violence.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have not been filled with good news either. Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not appear to have been limited by the diplomatic efforts of Britain, France and Germany. Whether Iran will build a nuclear weapon is still uncertain. But should that happen, the possible responses by Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iraq would not seem to favor peace and stability.
Saudi Arabia has continued to hunt down al Qaeda and terrorists. The offer of immunity has had a minimal effect and only a handful of terrorists have given themselves up. With oil prices still high, close to $40 a barrel, and the summer demand soon to be replaced with provisioning for winter, large decreases in oil are not expected. No matter how well or poorly the economic recovery is continuing globally, high oil prices if they continue will not be helpful. And while Russia has a less visible role in the region, its economic and business interests in Iran, Iraq and elsewhere are not helped by the perception in the United States that President Vladimir Putin’s campaigns against the oligarchs, particularly Yukos oil, and the media represent a return to an autocratic rule reminiscent of the old Soviet Union.
The sad fact is that violence and turmoil in Iraq are not in decline. Indeed, there is real concern that the insurgency may reflect the first stages of civil war in which Sunni and dissident Shia cannot tolerate a future democratic or even pluralistic state in which their power and authority are marginalized. The assassination of the governor of Mosul in the north, himself a Kurd, and the attempt to kill the Iraqi Justice Minister on July 18th, reported on page A-18 in the Washington Post that same day, are explicit proof that the disruption has not declined even if the reporting has.
Between now and the election in November and really January 20th, 2005 when the new president is inaugurated into office, the United States will have little opportunity for major course changes in policy unless there is some traumatic or dramatic event. Indeed, the administration is “spinning” the news hard to justify its actions and to make the best case whether or not it wins in November. Another September 11th type attack, the decision by Iran or North Korea to announce that they are in possession of nuclear weapons or a successful attempt to assassinate senior Iraqi leaders in large numbers could alter that prospect of policy continuity as well as the election.
Unfortunately, the dangers that arise from terror, inherent instability in the Middle East region and catalytic crises that could occur elsewhere, having the United States turn inwards to concentrate on choosing its next leader do not encourage optimism in blunting or containing potentially explosive situations from developing. For the next months, it is discouraging but almost certain that events will drive policy and not the other way around.
JIME center.All rights reserved.