JIME News Report

"Owls and Eagles"
The Greater Middle East: What Happens after June 30th?

Dr. Harlan Ullman(21/06/2004)

 On June 30th, as everyone knows, sovereignty was transferred to the new, provisional Iraqi government, itself selected largely through the good offices of United Nations High Representative Ladhakir Brahimi.  The meaning of “sovereignty” in this case is elastic and will be worked out between the new government and the new U.S. Embassy under Ambassador John Negroponte.  But, United States military operations will continue to be commanded and determined by American military officers, not Iraqis.  Hence, a complete transfer of sovereignty will occur only over time.

 Elections for the soon to be eighteen regional and single national Iraqi government are schedule for 2005.  However, those elections will require greater measures of security so that voting can be conducted safely as well as a relatively foolproof system of registration of Iraqi voters.  Many observers question whether or not the conditions on the ground in Iraq will permit legitimate elections to be held in which the results will lead to a government that is accepted by a majority of Iraqis.

 Why is this important especially to Japan?  Clearly, the United States and the Bush administration have risked the future on the Iraq intervention.  If Iraq deteriorates, Mr. Bush’s chances for re-election will diminish.  In Europe, the United States’ reputation has been greatly tarnished.  Many argue that the war was undertaken without just cause and one effect was to make both Iraq and the rest of the world less safe as a result of America’s failure to win the peace and make good on its promise that by bringing democracy to the Middle East, peace and stability would spread throughout the region.  Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction still have yet to be found and it many Iraqis are sufficiently infuriated by the occupation to take up arms and add to the insurgency.

 So far, Japanese peacekeepers and civilians in Iraq have been spared from the carnage and violence that is occurring throughout the country.  The three Japanese taken hostage were released safely.  However, in Afghanistan, over twenty Chinese workers were killed by Taliban or al Qaeda terrorists in a sector patrolled by German forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), murders purposely designed to embarrass those countries and remind them of the dangers.  Similar political killings have been carried out in Iraq and could happen to Japanese stationed there.

 The task of the new government is to begin the transition of an occupied Iraq to a self-governing and reasonably secure, functioning state.  The impediments and obstacles are both wide and deep.  The three major ethnic and religious factions---Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the center and Shia in the south--- have conflicting aims, intents and agendas. Tribal chiefs, independent clergy and local warlords complicate the politics and the road to an Iraq that is whole and free.  The absence of a robust and effective Iraqi security force---military, police, civil self-defense and border forces---and the difficulties in recruiting and training this force mean that the government will have to rely on American power.  That dependence, of course, diminishes the public perception of what sovereignty means and does not mean.

 At the same time, regional states such as Iran, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have divergent interests and aims.  Iran wants a stable and friendly Iraq and is using the common religious link between its and Iraq’s Shia majority as a means of exerting influence and persuasion on future policies that Baghdad will adopt. It is also threatening to turn its nuclear program to building a weapon. Turkey is mindful of the Kurdish north and the history of conflict that has persisted against its Kurdish minority that has been supported from Iraq.  

 Saudi Arabia faces a growing insurgency and the certainty of more terror attacks in attempts to discredit and depose the Royal family. Indeed, internal problems in Saudi Arabia from unemployment to intolerance and a ruling regime that is geriatric and autocratic are some of the reasons that explain why the Royal family is at risk. An unstable Iraq or one in which government is not under control creates the perception that the terrorists, including those operating in Saudi Arabia, are winning.

 Beyond the Gulf, Pakistan is far from stable irrespective of what happens post- June 30th.  There are many fundamentalists who want to see a religious, not a secular leadership in charge.  A future assassination attempt against President Pervez Musharaff, and there were at least a dozen last year, could succeed.

 The fact of the matter is that June 30th was only a date and nothing more.  The fact is that little will really change.  True, the old Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) disappeared.  But the new government is still transitional and the CPA has been replaced in kind by the new U.S. embassy.  Security and stability in Iraq will still rest on American arms.  And the funds for rebuilding and reconstructing Iraq remain American and the $18,4 billion approved by the U.S. Congress the bulk of which is unspent.

 The politics and symbolism of June 30th however are far more important than the facts.  The Bush administration will put great political stock on this transition.  In that view, Iraq is no responsible for its future.  The United States can be seen as moving to a secondary role as the president declares it is up to Iraq to rebuild itself.  As more responsibility shifts to Iraq, then, in the view of the administration, the less visible the U.S. presence can become.  The less visible, presumably the fewer American casualties will be taken, reducing public pressure at home for withdrawal. Unfortunately, despite the appeal of this logic, there is a tragic flaw.

 During the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration began a plan of “Vietnamization,” that is turning the fighting of the war over from American to Vietnamese troops.  Despite a smaller population, the north had far better forces.  The only thing that kept the “Vietnamized” South Vietnamese Army competitive was U.S. firepower.  When the U.S. withdrew in 1974, the result was predictable.  The South was overrun the next year.

 In Iraq, a parallel risk applies.  As the U.S. reduces its visibility, Iraq must fill the gap.  The new government has not been able to reconcile the huge ethnic, religious, cultural and political differences that fire the insurgency and that could lead to civil war or de facto partition.  Security forces must restrain the violence and impose some measure of law and order.  June 30th has now mandated that reality.  The test is whether or not Iraqis will be up to that task.  The prognosis is not good.  If that situation holds, then no one, including Japan, can be safer or more secure from terror.  That is the lesson we sadly may have to draw from June 30th.


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