Following the fall of Baghdad, the United States turned up the heat against Iran, most vehemently accusing it of pursuing nuclear weapons. Iran admits it has nuclear intentions, but maintains it is only for peaceful purposes. America's inability to find evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program (the famous “smoking gun”) has hurt its credibility on this issue, and limits its options in Iran.
Iranian statements about its nuclear program remain ambiguous. Domestically, officials assure the public that Iran is determined to pursue a nuclear policy. To the world, they explain that means developing non-military technology, cooperating with the IAEA, and adhering to its NPT obligations.
That said, Iran has its own reasons to develop nuclear power. It aspires to Islamic leadership, which it feels requires joining the nuclear “club.” Also, other regional states (Pakistan, India, Israel) have, or are believed to have such capabilities. Most importantly, the war in Iraq taught the need for a deterrent, to make Iran less susceptible to American military action as North Korea has. Both reformists and conservatives share this ambition, although conservatives – who are more vocal on this issue – retain exclusive control of issues relating to national interest. When Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol to the NPT (October 2003), some conservatives expressed discontent about what they viewed as a sell-out of national prestige and the prospect of foreign involvement in Iran. Following their 2004 parliamentary win, conservatives went on to present western policy as a double standard and conspiracy to stifle Iran's development.
Opponents of a nuclear Iran, most notably the U.S. and Israel, maintain that it is dangerous for a regime with such an extremist ideology to possess nuclear power. The transformation from a peaceful nuclear capability to a military one, it is maintained, is relatively easy and unpreventable. Iran has sufficient oil and gas reserves, they further argue, and does not need nuclear technology that would change the rules of the game in the region. Aware of the challenge, America has pressured the EU, Russia and the IAEA to closely check Iran’s efforts. Its own attitude remains uncompromising. Already before Khatami's second term (August 2001), the U.S. extended the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act for another five years. In January 2002, President Bush included Iran in his “axis of evil,” and in July 2002, he attacked the “unelected people who are the real rulers of Iran.” Iranian conservatives have run into the neo-conservatives in Washington who insist on actual change in the areas of terrorism, Iraq and WMD.
Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons or failing to comply with the NPT. On 9 February 2003, President Khatami said that Iran “is determined to make use of sophisticated technology, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” Rafsanjani, the head of Iran's powerful Expediency Council, said that arguing that Iran should not develop nuclear energy because it has rich oil resources is baseless, since Russia and the U.S. too, have oil and gas. Moreover, under the Shah, “the Americans themselves proposed a [nuclear] plan to Iran.” Still, faced with fierce western opposition, Iran agreed to “voluntarily” suspend its uranium enrichment program in the short-term to promote international confidence. In 2004 there were signs of growing displeasure by the European “big three” (France, Germany and the UK) of Iran’s failure to adhere to its commitments. At this stage, the EU seemed getting closer to the U.S. positions. Disappointed by unfavorable western attitudes, Iran has stepped up its diplomacy ahead of the September 2004 IAEA Vienna meeting, hoping to counter a U.S. initiative to refer its case to the UN Security Council.
Viewed from Tehran, America's stance toward Iran depends on two sets of issues, foreign and domestic. First, whether or not the U.S. finds a “smoking gun” in Iraq dictates whether it would be willing and able to mobilize international support for an anti-Iranian move. Second, the timing and outcome of America's November elections could influence policy. Iran will probably draw the conclusion that a non-conventional capability is the best way to spare it from Iraq's fate. Ironically, acting on this conclusion might provoke the strongest American response. In fact, whenever Washington examines the Middle East it finds Iran opposing it: supporting radical Palestinian movements, backing Hizballah, acting against its interests in Afghanistan and Iraq, upgrading its missiles, and pursuing nuclear energy.
Two parallel political processes are at work in Iran. Power has shifted away from the more pragmatic elements toward the conservatives, who are pushing hard to gain nuclear technology. The U.S., on its part, is determined to prevent Iran’s nuclear acquisition. As long as there is no sign of a dramatic change from within, a cooperative transatlantic effort seems the best tool to achieve this goal. Given the realities in Iraq, and the lack of WMD evidence there, it will be difficult to form an anti-Iran coalition and even mobilize American public opinion against Iran. A UN Security Council resolution would likely be mild enough to satisfy all parties, or risk being vetoed. On the other hand, Iran’s revolutionary experience has shown that its ruling elite are attentive to outside pressure. Unanimous and determined international action with the appropriate mechanism of supervision may have significant effect. In this sense, the IAEA resolution (18 September 2004) was a step in the right direction. It "strongly urged" Iran to live up to its commitments, and "to take all steps within its power to clarify the outstanding issues” before the Board's November meeting. It also deeply regrets that Iran’s implementation of its voluntary decisions “fell significantly short” of expectations, and maintains that “Iran has since reversed some of those decisions.” Iran strongly rejected the resolution, insisting that uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes is its legitimate right, but will not be able to ignore it either. It will probably continue to try and gain time.
For its part, Israel has intensified its diplomatic activity, mainly by pressuring Washington to harden its attitude toward Tehran—a policy it will surely continue after the November elections. By and large, Israel’s attitude is to depend on others to deny Iran access to nuclear weapons—until it feels forced to depend on itself.
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