The war in Iraq had far-reaching implications for Iran’s policy and standing. It took place in a neighboring country and in a region which Iran has vital interests; and it was waged by Iran’s archenemy (the United States), against its main regional adversary (Iraq). While the war could advance certain Iranian interests, it also implied serious challenges, depending on the identity, measure of stability and future policy of the new regime in Iraq; and on the degree of future American involvement; and other regional developments. The spectacular demonstration of strength of the U.S.-led troops in the 2003 war, the abrupt collapse of the Iraqi armed forces and the continued U.S. presence in Iraq exacerbated the risks for Iran. At the same time, the difficulties facing the U.S. forces since the fall of Saddam Husayn and the lack of evidence to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq produced some potential benefits for Tehran. Clearly, however, the realities on the Iranian borders have significantly changed since the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
This momentous change occurred during a rocky time in Iran’s domestic front, typified by mounting – social, political and economic – difficulties, and consequent popular disillusionment and public disaffection. At the same time, relations with most of its neighbors continue to be marked by distrust and hostility and the United States has now encircled all around Iran’s borders – mainly on its east (Afghanistan) and west (Iraq) – and it seems determined to pursue its “war against terrorism.”
Iran’s attitude to the war – similar to its policy on numerous domestic and foreign policy issues – remained intricate and multifaceted. It had no sympathy for Saddam, but there was no great affection for the U.S. either. Therefore, while two of its adamant foes were fighting each other, Iran wished to limit perilous ramifications and to secure its longer-range interests.
Although some of Iran’s interests in Iraq overlapped with those of the U.S., they are not identical. The two states differed in their perception of the Iraqi threat and the ways to confront it. America’s status as the sole superpower and its inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” along with Washington’s assertive attitude towards Iran, also posed a serious challenge. Many of the stated objectives of the war in Iraq – elimination of WMD, suppression of state-supported terrorism, regime change through external intervention, democratization through military means – could easily be applied to Iran as well. Consequently, Iran persisted in its two-track diplomacy: vigorous criticism of the U.S., coupled with pragmatic measures to safeguard its post-war interests. It strengthened its links with Iraqi oppositions, deepened dialogue with the EU, tightened ties with Russia. In fact, its policies fluctuated from measures aimed to reassure opinion in the U.S. to active support for its rivals – mainly the Iraqi Shi'is.
As the war drew nearer, the disparity in their attitudes came into sharper relief. While Iran wished to see an end to the Iraqi regime; it was uncomfortable about the U.S. toppling Saddam and the instalment of a government of its choice. Viewed from Tehran, thus, the war against Iraq was appropriate, but it was waged by the wrong power – the “Great Satan.” While the U.S. on its part wished to replace the Iraqi regime, it did not wish it to be replaced by an (Shi‘i) Islamist power. While Washington wished for a swift and decisive victory, Tehran preferred it to turn into a long and protracted conflict, with no clear victor and with both sides anguished. Unlike the U.S., Iran hoped that the war would provoke a storm of anti-Americanism – in Iran and worldwide. Also, Iran wished to see Russia and the EU more active as balancing powers in the region, while Washington wanted to limit their involvement. The U.S. wished to be the main power behind the war against terrorism, while Iran wanted the international community to play such a role. Finally, whereas the U.S. viewed the war in Iraq as another step in combating terrorism, Iran preferred that this will be the last phase in the war against terrorism.
The visions of Iran and the U.S. for “the day after the war” were similarly in sharp conflict. The U.S. seemed determined to preserve its interests in Iraq for the long-run and wished to play a central role in its rehabilitation, while Iran was apprehensive of a prolonged American presence there and the formation of a government under its control. Washington hoped to transform Iraq into a bridgehead for democracy in the region, while Iran was concerned of the spread of liberal ideas among its disaffected youth – particularly when it comes from the direction of Iraq and backed by the United States. In fact, the least desirable scenario for Iran was Iraqi disintegration and the formation of independent entities, most perilously a Kurdish state. While Iran could benefit from a weak Iraqi government, a stronger government, capable of securing the free influx of oil could better suit American interests. While one of the most important aims of the U.S. was to prevent new states in the region from possessing nuclear power, the lesson for Iran could be totally different: the need to acquire such capabilities in order to save if from the fate of Iraq – acquiring it a position similar to North Korea. Finally, by removing Saddam’s regime, the U.S. fulfilled one of Khomeini’s main aims. Clearly, the U.S. wished to avoid realizing another Iranian aspiration – an Islamist regime in Iraq.
Although criticism of the U.S. was almost universal, Iranian reformers and conservatives adopted notably different tones prior to the war. The latter used particularly crude language, attacking the U.S. for violating Iraqi sovereignty, and accused it of a conspiracy to steal the region’s oil and control the entire region. The former, avoided ideological demagoguery and chose their words more carefully. Following the military victory, new conflicts have emerged and Iran’s anti-U.S. tone has turned sharper: criticizing the damage done to the Iraqi people and state. Still, their main disagreement was regarding the future government in Iraq, the American drive to pursue the war against terrorism and issues relating to nuclear proliferation.
The fall of the Iraqi regime, the relative freedom that the Shi‘is have gained and the growing difficulties the U.S. troops are facing, carried significant advantages for Iran. Although Iran disclaims stirring up violence in Iraq the U.S. blame it for doing exactly that. As far as Iran is concerned, the new developments posed additional challenges. For one thing, the change in Iraq may lead to the re-emergence of Najaf, the holiest Shi‘i city, as the main scholarly center for Shi‘ism, challenging thus the newly gained centrality by Qom. This could also lead to fostering a more moderate interpretation of religion, challenging Iran’s authority among the world’s Shi‘is and serving Iranian reformers at home. Scholars associated with Najaf, it should be recalled, do not necessarily share Khomeini’s radical-activist interpretations. The attitudes adopted by Ayatollah Sistani make such a gap clearly evident. His departure for medical treatment to London just prior on the American attack on Moqtada al-Sadr (August 2004) further attests to such disparities. In fact, while sharing the same belief, the Shi’is in Iraq and Iran have their own differences and not all Shi‘is – both in Iran and in Iraq – follow the same political line.
Following the war, thus, Iranian leaders seemed worried by the invasion of Iraq and the speedy toppling of the regime; the American contiued presence at their gates; the marginalization of the UN and the European states; by the threat they sensed from the perceived American schemes; and by the disillusion of the Iranian people and the vox populi which seems to demand – more than ever before – reform and change.
Iran thus hopes for complications in the American plans (mainly with the approach of the elections in the U.S.), including growing Iraqi resistance, European and UN pressure and inflamed tensions between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and Hizballah. It also uses all available tools to strengthen its influence inside Iraq – a region with vital interest for it. And Iran will probably draw the conclusion that a non-conventional capability is the best way to spare it from a fate similar to Iraq’s. Ironically, acting on such conclusions is likely to provoke the strongest and most direct American response.
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