The Islamic revolution was a major turning point in the modern history of Iran, with reverberations far beyond its borders. Carried on the wave of their dramatic victory, Ayatollah Khomeini and his disciples sought to implement the revolutionary ideology, to alleviate the general feeling of malaise in the country, to develop Iran into a prosperous country and, in turn, further consolidate and legitimize clerical rule. Gradually, however, faced with harsh realities, ideology was subordinated to interests and actual policy succeeded in combining ideological conviction with regard for the national interest. Still, concerning the scope and depth of transformation, domestic factions widely differed.
Both main trends competing for predominance – generally defined as “reformists” and “conservatives,” with many sub-groups in each camp – are engaged in a struggle to dictate the politics of new Iran. While both movements have been part of the "Imam Khomeini's Line" their differences are profound, covering major policy realms.
In a nutshell, this is a contest between the revolutionary ideals of 1979 and the spirit of the 1997 reform movement. It is equally a contest between institutions of power and the emerging civil society; between the old guards and the new generation; between the elected and the nominated institutions of power. While reformists support greater political freedom, economic openness and social change at home and advocating improved ties with the world abroad—including defusing tension with the United States—the conservatives emphasize the centrality of the initial values of the revolution and the supremacy of dogma in formulating policy. It is a profound and vigorous debate, based on such focal questions as religion and state, idealism versus national interests, isolationism against globalization and the preferred attitude to be adopted vis-à-vis the outside world—particularly towards neighbouring states and the United States.
Eventually, however, the conservatives, the “unelected few”—to use a favoured terminology from Washington—enjoy disproportionately more power in the ruling institutions than in society. Even if lacking electoral majority, they possess essential and most valuable assets: For one thing, the conservatives speak in the name of Islam thereby enjoying much influence in the community. Also, they enjoy the loyalty of the security forces (the Revolutionary Guards, the Army and other revolutionary law-enforcement bodies). Additionally, they seem unwilling to voluntarily concede power.
In addition to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, the reformists must reckon with powerful institutions. The judiciary (headed by Ayatollah Shahrudi) has traditionally worked to block or slow down new initiatives, becoming an obstacle to reformism. The Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council and the powerful revolutionary foundations—along with a range of semi-governmental bodies and vigilante movements—often resist reformism. Former President ‘Ali Akbar Rafsanjani is another force with whom they must contend. He lost much credit after his presidential terms (1997) and was humiliated in the 2000 Majlis elections. Yet, his record, experience, and close ties to Khamene’i and leading conservatives make him a significant presence. In addition, he holds the sensitive post of the head of the Expediency Council, which has key decision-making authority in disputes between the different branches of government. No less significant, issues of great concern to the United States—i.e., national security and weapons of mass destruction—fall under the authority of the Supreme Leader Khamene’i and the conservative establishment, not President Khatami.
The reformists also have their own weaknesses—which, in turn, is another asset for the conservatives. Khatami’s presidency, while harbouring the potential for change, did not constitute a new regime, but a fresh approach within the revolutionary system. Khatami viewed his mission to reform policy, not to change the regime; to save the revolution, not to totally abandon dogma. Moreover, as people close to him recently said, the president is not more a compromiser than a warrior. All in all, the reform trend has so far failed to lead Iran along its preferred path. In fact, in all significant tests of power the conservatives remain triumphant and the reformists were forced to comply.
Thus, in July 1999, when the restrictions on the press law triggered student protests, President Khatami was intimidated into an embarrassing silence, unable to defend his own supporters. In August 2000, following the smashing success of the pragmatists in the Majlis elections, Khamene’i ordered the reform-oriented Majlis to discard the press bill they wished to approve. In August 2001, the conservative-led judiciary successfully introduced candidates for vacant seats on the Council of Guardians over the objections of the Majlis. Finally, the more recent municipal elections (2003) and elections to the Majlis (2004) attest to the conservatives determination—and success—to maintain power.
There are certain common denominators in the above episodes.
Still, with all the potential power of the reform camp, the conservatives continued to maintain actual power, with the recent developments—in the region and at home—further strengthening them:
Twenty-five years on, thus, the new regime is still searching for an appropriate path to cope with the challenge of governance while contending with domestic upheaval, severe social and economic difficulties, perpetual struggle for power between competing tendencies and grave regional changes. Still, the stability of the regime seems to depend less on the degree of return to Islam than on the government’s ability to satisfy the—social, economic, political—expectations that initially brought it to power. This remains the revolution’s main challenge, and it is in this area that significant progress has yet to be achieved; and over such issues opinions in Iran continue to be divided. Consequently, Iranian policy remained fluid, divergent and often contradictory—in domestic politics as in foreign relations.
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