Iran’s Islamic Revolution Twenty-Five Years Later:
Vision and Reality

  In February, Iran marked the 25th anniversary of its Islamic Revolution. However, for all the fanfare traditionally heaped upon administrations during such events, the anniversary was also accompanied by a sober and soul-searching process regarding the regime’s most basic ideological dilemmas, such as: Islam and democracy; Persian heritage and Islamic tradition; Islam and the West. These national reflections went far beyond token discussions of purely theoretical dimensions; rather, they delved into questions regarding the very underpinnings of revolutionary policy: the validity of a government of religious sages, the utility of Iran’s animosity towards the US; the import of preserving religious doctrines in light of national interests.

　To place this popular contemplation in context we must look to the root causes of the revolution. In fact, Iranians rose up against the Shah for a variety of reasons, and viewed Islam as the means to end vast societal malaise. The revolutionary credo “Islam is the solution” best embodied this deep-rooted and multi-dimensional vision. However, this credo has so far been insufficient to resolve the problems facing Islamic Iran – just as it hasn’t in Afghanistan or Sudan. Clearly, the regime has demonstrated an impressive measure of political resilience and continuity. Yet, popular expectations for practical advancement have, for the most part, remained unfulfilled and the necessity to reconsider past politics has become more pressing.   

　Frustration regarding the still unripe fruits of revolution is not limited to any particular sector. Many of those who joined the revolution hoping to improve their dire economic situation have not succeeded in improving their lot; many of those who saw the revolution as a vehicle for social mobility have been disappointed; those who supported it from a desire for freedom have not seen their dreams realized yet. Moreover, even though Iran has indeed succeeded in fortifying its political independence, this success has been qualified by international isolation for especially prolonged periods during revolution, protracted and catastrophic war with Iraq (1980-1988), regional tension, economic decline, and, most recently, its inclusion in the ranks of the so called ‘Axis of Evil’. Consequently, a fair amount of public disenchantment and bitterness can be discerned, mainly among Iranian youth – the majority of whom support the push towards reform.    

　And yet, while avowing allegiance to the revolutionary creed, the regime was no stranger to pure considerations of state. To a large extent measures of realism were inevitable: not from a newfound moderation, but rather from an unavoidable need to grapple with the exigencies of Iran’s dismal socio-political situation. Accordingly, with very few exceptions, whenever ideological convictions clashed with state interests, pragmatism triumphed over dogma. However, with respect to the specific areas of reform and the appropriate degree and pace of change, Iran’s domestic factions are widely and vigorously at odds. Moreover, although allowing for a measure of pragmatism, the regime has proved less effective in easing the mounting social, political, and economic problems that were the root cause of the revolution. To compound its domestic dilemmas, Iran has also recently found itself hemmed in regionally and internationally. In January of 2002, the US, in pursuit of its “war against terrorism,” included Iran in the “Axis of Evil.” Subsequently, the ensuing wars on its east (Afghanistan) and west (Iraq) flanks completed the sense of encirclement.

　In many respects, the revolution has not yet culminated nor have its important goals been fully achieved. Yet, it was the revolution itself, which had shaken the country so dramatically, that provides the grounds for distinguishing between the passing and permanent phenomena of Iran’s 200-year association with the West. By examining Iran’s modern history through this lens, one can identify particular trends in post-revolutionary Iran:

•  Iranians, more than any other peoples in the Middle East, are active in the political arena. In fact, the primary developments in modern Iran were formulated by popular participation. This popular involvement, evident since the late 19th century, has stretched into post-revolutionary Iran. Recent youth and women’s activity and the courageous intellectual struggle are examples of the continuity of popular participation.
•  The pursuit of freedom continues to represent a central axis for internal advances. Iran is the only country in the region to undergo a constitutional revolution (1905), and the struggle for freedom has accompanied its history ever since, such as in the movement headed by Mohammad Mossadeq of the early 1950’s, and through the Islamic revolution. Many in Iran continue to perceive freedom as a supreme value and struggle for its advancement, even if this ideal has been left largely unfulfilled.  
• Nationalism – another byproduct of the Middle East’s association with the West – became deeply rooted in the region. In Iran, a long-time independent with a distinctive culture, nationalist leanings were all the more apparent. In fact, in every conflict between national and revolutionary interests, national considerations won out. Similarly, the Islamic revolution did not diminish Iranians’ national loyalty or the affinity for their pre-Islamic culture.   
• Similarly, Islam resides deep within the heart of the Iranian people and this reality can be expected to persist. Nevertheless, 25 years after the revolution, new voices with alternative religious ideologies are calling for fresh interpretations of the faith. A number of senior religious figures are also calling for the separation of Mosque and State in order to protect both of them.
• The Islamic Revolution, like every ideological movement that moves from opposition to control, was forced to conform to political necessities. Accordingly, the primary political struggle in Iran became centered, not on whether, but on how and to what extent to advance change. But although a considerable measure of liberalism regarding political rights is evident – especially when compared to neighboring countries – for all practical purposes the regime remains in the hands of the conservatives.
• Iranian history relied on an integration of Persian Culture and Islamic Heritage. The Shah and Khomeini, each in his own way, attempted to upset this equilibrium. Yet the Shah could not totally separate Iran from the tradition of Imam ‘Ali, much as Khomeini could not totally break Iran’s links with the Persian heritage. Consequently, both religious and national interests remain powerful components in shaping Iran’s outward outlook.
• Today the country appears to be resting on an additional leg as well, that of Western influence. Basic values that were imported from the West – constitutionalism, parliamentarism, new education – continue to maintain a high regard. Even if the revolution succeeded in injecting new meanings into the western-inspired concepts, it could not erase the impact of 200 years of contact with the West.   
• Ultimately, there is no doubt that Iran’s social, economic and political woes were the fuel that fired the engine of the revolution, just as they galvanized the movement of Islamic activism in general. As such, one of the preconditions of the final stabilization of the revolution is the proper treatment – if not the effective solution – for the crises that initiated Iran’s discontent from the outset.

　The Iranian ship of state continues to hover between various poles, in constant search of a proper equilibrium between its Islamic heritage and pre-Islamic tradition, between the legacy of King Cyrus and the tradition of Imam `Ali, between Islam and the West, between revolutionary ideology and national interest. Iranian policy, thus, has developed into a dualistic, complex and intricate set of laws and strategies – generally characterized by pragmatism but streaked with radical guidelines for good measure. Iranian “Islamic” policies thus remain fluid, divergent and often contradictory and in perpetual search of an appropriate balance between idealistic convictions and the glaring realities of a dire socio-economic predicament.