Violent attacks in Saudi Arabia have acquired a new seriousness and frequency, provoking distinct nervousness in the oil markets and persistent questions about whether a major attack on oil installations may be imminent and whether the House of Saud can survive.
The violence indicates that the ruling princes are facing a determined insurgency whose clear and indeed explicit aims are to drive Westerners from the country and overthrow the House of Saud. It is a radical Sunni insurgency well rooted in different parts of the country, and it has clear links with Al-Qaida (even if freelance elements occasionally join in, as Islamist websites openly call on them do). And although the Saudi authorities have arrested hundreds of militants and thwarted a number of car bombings, their claim to have dismantled all but one of the militant cells is scarcely credible.
Whether the militants want to damage or even shut down the Saudi oil industry, thereby crippling the economy, is, however, debatable. It is true that the two major attacks in May targetted the oil centres of Yanbu in the west and Al-Khobar in the east. But in each case these were not attacks against oil installations; nor were they high-tech operations. On the contrary, they were low-tech attacks troubling certainly against targets of opportunity, namely Westerners in oil-related jobs. (In the Al-Khobar attacks Indian, Filipino and Sri Lankan workers were killed as well as Westerners, but it appears that Westerners Crusaders in Al-Qaida parlance were the principal intended victims.)
The statements and debates on the websites indicate that the militants carefully monitor the effect of their operations on Saudi public opinion. So, although a dramatic attack against oil installations cant be ruled out, its likely the militants would hesitate before launching operations which would risk seriously alienating ordinary Saudis some of whom clearly admire Bin Laden but are shocked and repelled by the killing of Saudi or other Muslims.
The principal question raised by the recent spate of attacks, therefore, is their political impact on the Saudi ruling family. Most experts believe the collapse of the House of Saud is unlikely, for several reasons. The militants are determined, but they are a small minority. The Saudi security forces, for all their deficiencies (and occasionally rivalries), are capable of securing the regime. The House of Saud is not popular but its grip on power is stronger than many outsiders imagine.
But most of the same experts believe it is short-sighted to believe a sustained crackdown will, by itself, resolve the current crisis. Despite continuing talk of political reform, the senior princes have in reality backed away from their recent pledges to make themselves somewhat more accountable. The arrest of a dozen-or-so prominent reformists in March was a powerful signal that the security agenda of the minister of the interior, Prince Nayef, now takes precedence over all other considerations.
Many Saudis who had pinned their hopes for change on Crown Prince Abdullah, the countrys de facto ruler, are now disappointed. Some of the younger princes are also known to favour political as well as economic liberalisation. But for the time being they have been eclipsed. Support for the view that there must be an all-out war against the militants has come from Prince Bandar, the long-serving ambassador in Washington. In an outspoken article in the newspaper Al-Watan (a translation of which later appeared in the Washington Post) he made an outspoken call for the mobilisation of Saudi society against the extremists. In tones reminiscent of George Bushs famous phrase You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists the prince declared that all Saudis, including the religious leaders, had to decide whose side they were on.
He offered no hint that the ruling family was ready to embark on serious reform as the necessary price for winning the support of the people. As with the global war on terror, the Saudi princes are engaged in a battle for hearts and minds, as well as in conventional counter-terrorism. It is not clear that, on either front, they are winning.
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